Law Schools, the Justice Mission, and Bob McKay by Sexton, John
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1992
Law Schools, the Justice Mission, and Bob McKay
John Sexton
New York University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Legal Education Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Sexton, Law Schools, the Justice Mission, and Bob McKay, 40 Clev. St. L. Rev. 343 (1992)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol40/iss3/7
LAW SCHOOLS, THE JUSTICE MISSION, AND
BOB MCKAY
JOHN SEXTON1
I am privileged to be a linear descendant of Bob McKay and Norman Redlich.
They are part of a line of great NYU Law School deans committed to the "justice
mission." I am emboldened to speak today only because I represent the
tradition they established and nurtured. Let me begin with a few general
observations.
The first concerns the basic pedagogical theory which drives the way we
conduct legal education. From the moment George Wythe began to teach law,
we who are in legal academe were condemned to a kind of institutional
schizophrenia which still exists and which confounds us as we try to
understand and define our mission: law schools are professional schools in
research universities; and thus have two masters. We must produce people
prepared to practice at the very highest levels; and we must produce the kind
of detached thinking that one associates with a great research institution.
Most of us were educated in the system created by Christopher Columbus
Langdell: the casebook method. In creating the casebook method, Langdell
took scientific inquiry as his model and applied the notion of scientific inquiry
to legal analysis. He took the decisions of appellate judges as his raw material;
and he assumed that if a young scholar studied closely a given corpus juris, he
or she could master the "body of law." Langdell's notion was a version of
Charles Eliot's "five-foot shelf," which Eliot captured in Harvard Classics.
Culture, Eliot thought, could be captured in a given canon; so also legal culture,
Langdell thought, could be captioned in a given canon.
Traditional legal education very well achieves a certain rigor of analysis.
Regardless of the legitimate criticisms that can be made of the inadequacies of
legal education, we should not underestimate the reality that the traditional
casebook method of instruction stands with the close study of philosophical
and scriptural texts in rigor of analysis. In many ways, scholars of the law are
the envy of other disciplines because a legal education imparts such a rigorous
and focused methodology. As we pursue other goals, we must not forfeit the
special and positive attributes of what we already have.
Having said this, it is still startling that Langdell's method enjoys the
pervasive dominance of legal education that it does. For many institutions, it
is virtually the single mode of instruction; and even where inroads have been
made, the casebook method maintains a dominant position. This state of affairs
is particularly startling because in some ways the intellectual justification and
underpinnings of Langdell's method have collapsed. First, as an empirical
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matter the corpus juris is now so vast that it is uncontrollable, surely it cannot
be captured in a five foot shelf. And, second, even if one could achieve a mastery
of the entire corpus juris at a particular moment, one's knowledge would be
irrelevant in only a few years. In short, the notion of a static corpus juris which
provided the foundation upon which Langdell built his model is impossible to
maintain.
Let me move to another general observation. Just as the pedagogical theory
which drives legal education has been changing, so also the demographics of
our students are changing. We must be mindful that, for better or for worse,
law schools are now drawing a disproportionately high share of the best
students in the country. The top students are not going to medical school, they
are not going to business school and they certainly are not pursuing Ph.D.'s -
at least not in the numbers in which our society needs. We therefore are being
entrusted with a great many of society's brightest people. First, this simple fact
affects pedagogy. These bright people master the legal analysis taught by the
casebook method quickly, certainly by the end of the first year (or, if they are a
bit off the pace by the end of a year and a half). They also learn rapidly that the
law is not revealed truth, and that there are complex factors which create a rule
of law. They know that law ultimately is a derivative discipline. They learn that
ultimately traditional doctrine breaks through the doctrinal boundaries into a
vacuum, and that there must be some external referent point by which to
anchor doctrine. That referent point may be religion, philosophy, economics,
anthropology, sociology, or some other discipline. The referent point must be
there to justify legal rules.
Our law students also learn very quickly that the cases they study are not
about real people while the practice of law is about real people. To the extent
that a career in the law is attractive to most of them, it is because they feel that
as a discipline, law might make a positive difference. To the extent we rely on
the Langdellian model, however, we present them with reified sets of facts in
unemotional, filtered terms. We also teach them almost exclusively from the
pathological cases. Thus their learning is disconnected from the reality of what
most lawyers do most of the time.
In response to this shortcoming we have begun to develop other modes of
education. We are developing multidisciplinary studies with the goal of
teaching our students how to find and use the referent disciplines even if they
are not trained in those disciplines, and to do so in a way that connects them
to the principles, insights and methods of those referent disciplines.
At the same time, and from a different direction, we have begun to use what
I call, "situational education," most readily seen in clinical courses. In
situational education, we start the student not in an appellate court but in a
human situation. We therefore force the student to respond right at the
threshold to the question: "What is it that I as a lawyer should do in this
situation?"
These two supplements (not replacements, but supplements) to the casebook
method are essential parts of the legal education of the future that must come
to our law schools. Indeed, in my view, only if we supplement the casebook
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One final general observation: Even the way we use the casebook method
must change. Specifically, to the extent we rely on the casebook method, we
should insist that students go deeply into general subject areas over their three
years of study. For example, instead of taking several basic statutory courses
(or common law courses, or procedural courses), the student should attack a
given statute (or a given common law area, and so on) more and more deeply
over three years. It does not matter whether the statute is tax or labor law or
environmental law; the essential thing is learning fundamentally and deeply
how to deal with a statute, a skill which later will be transportable to other
statutes.
The general points I have made link to the justice mission of law schools.
That mission demands that students be exposed to what lawyers do in the lives
of people on the one hand and to the need for reference to normative disciplines
on the other. And the justice mission requires that they be steeped deeply in
the law. Lawyers are empowered within our society at a time when our
institutions either have crumbled or are in the process of crumbling. The role
of the lawyer as civil priest is extremely important. We must inculcate in our
students, especially these special students who are entrusted to us these days,
their vital role as civil priest. They must be made to understand the
empowerment granted by a law degree. They have to be made to understand
that whether they choose to toil in the largest of the large firms or in a single
lawyer office for migrants in the smallest town in Texas, they must use for the
good their training and knowledge of this special domain of our society, and
they must anchor their practice in values. When we move away from the
exclusive reliance on the depersonalized, pseudo-scientific method of the
casebook, and move into situational leaming and multidisciplinary work, we
will fulfill this justice function better.
Bob McKay not only personified the ideal to which we should aspire for each
of our students, but also understood the general points I have made and
nurtured each of the developments I have suggested; indeed, many of these
developments were first seen at NYU during his tenure as Dean. By dedicating
this conference to him, you signal not only that he was a special person and a
great public servant, but also that he understood the connections I have
described. And, theory aside, you have captured aptly the justice mission of
American law schools: produce more persons like Bob McKay.
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